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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

KAREN JEAN BUCK,
Petitioner/Appellee,

Case No. 20060760

vs.
ROBERT DEAN ROBINSON,
Respondent/Appellant.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is from a Ruling entered in the Second District Court on the 5th day of
July, 2006, by the Honorable Judge Ernie W. Jones. The Utah Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(h).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
WHETHER the trial court erred in upholding the practice of allowing court
commissioners to hold evidentiary hearings, make rulings and determine the outcome of a
petition for a protective order in contested domestic matters when such practice is an
unconstitutional delegation of a core judicial function.
WHETHER the trial court erred in not finding that the practice of allowing court
commissioner to hold evidentiary hearings in contested domestic matters is violative of
Rule 6-401(J)(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
WHETHER the trial court erred in denying a request for an evidentiary hearing

pursuant Utah Code Ann. §30-6-4.3(l)(e) (2006).
WHETHER the trial court erred in not finding Utah Code Ann. §30-6-4.3(l)(e)
(2006) unconstitutional on its face since it does not provide for a jury.
WHETHER the trial court erred in concluding that the presentation of a facial
challenge was a violation of Rule 11.
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The standard of appellate review in the first four issues raise both statutory and
constitutional interpretation which this Court will "perform without deference to the trial
court's determinations." Utah Safe to Learn-Safe to Worship Coalition, Inc. v. State, 94
P.3d 217 (Utah 2004).
The standard of appellate review of issue five also involves statutory and
constitutional interpretation which this Court will "perform without deference to the trial
court's determinations." Utah Safe to Learn-Safe to Worship Coalition, Inc. v. State, 94
P. 3d 217 (Utah 2004). The standard of appellate review of the issue of Rule 11 violations
and sanctions is "involves a three-tiered approach: (1) findings of fact are reviewed under
the clearly erroneous standard; (2) legal conclusions are reviewed under the correction of
error standard; and (3) the type and amount of sanction to be imposed is reviewed under
an abuse of discretion standard." Morse v. Packer, 15 P.3d 1021, 1025 (Utah 2000).
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES AND PROPRIETY OF REVIEW
The aforementioned issues were preserved at the trial level. Motion, pgs 37-46.
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RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
The Appellant identifies the following constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances
and rules as those "whose interpretation is determinative" within the meaning of Utah R.
App. P. 24(a)(6):
Article L section 10 of the Utah Constitution, provides that
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In capital
cases the jury shall consist of twelve persons, and in all other felony cases,
the jury shall consist of no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the
Legislature shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no event
shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal cases the verdict
shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict.
A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded.
Rule 6-401(2)(D-K) and (3) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, provides that
(D) Make recommendations to the court regarding any issue, including a
recommendation for entry of final judgment, in domestic relations or spouse
abuse cases at any stage of the proceedings; (E) Require counsel to file with
the initial or responsive pleading, a certificate based upon the facts available
at that time, stating whether there is a legal action pending or previously
adjudicated in a district or juvenile court of any state regarding the minor
child(ren) in the current case; (F) At the commissioner's discretion, and after
notice to all parties or their counsel, conduct evidentiary hearings consistent
with paragraph (3)(C) below; (G) Impose sanctions against any party who
fails to comply with the commissioner's requirements of attendance or
production of discovery; (H) Impose sanctions against any person who acts
contemptuously under Utah Code Section 78-32-10; (I) Issue temporary or ex
parte orders; (J) Conduct settlement conferences with the parties and their
counsel in a domestic relations case. Issues that cannot be settled shall be
certified to the district court for trial; and (K) Conduct pretrial conferences
with the parties and their counsel on all domestic relations matters unless
otherwise ordered by the presiding judge. The commissioner shall make
recommendations on all issues under consideration at the pretrial and submit
those recommendations to the district court. (3) Duties of court
commissioner. Under the general supervision of the presiding judge, the court
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commissioner has the following duties prior to any domestic matter being
heard by the district court: (A) Review all pleadings in each case; (B) Certify
those cases directly to the district court that appear to require a hearing
before the district court judge; (C) Except in cases previously certified to the
district court, conduct hearings with parties and their counsel for the purpose
of submitting recommendations to the parties and the court; (D) Coordinate
information with the juvenile court regarding previous or pending proceedings
involving children of the parties; and (E) Refer appropriate cases to mediation
programs if available. (4) Prohibitions. (A) Commissioners shall not make
final adjudications of domestic relations matters.
Utah Code Ann. §30-6-4.3m(e) (20061 provides that
If the hearing on the petition is heard by a commissioner, either the petitioner
or respondent may file an objection within ten days of the entry of the
recommended order and the assigned judge shall hold a hearing within 20
days of the filing of the objection.
Rule 11(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that
By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper to the court (whether
by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating), an attorney or
unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances, (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such
as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new
law;
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellee filed a Verified Petition for Protective Order with the Second District
Court on the 9th day of February, 2006. Page 1-8. The case was assigned to Judge Ernie
W. Jones. An Ex Parte Protective Order was signed at 3:45 p.m. by W. Brent West. Page
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9-10. A Notice of Hearing was prepared setting the Appellee's hearing for the 27th day of
February, 2006, before Commissioner Daniel W. Gamer.
On the 27th day of February, 2006, the Appellant appeared pro se and objected to
the issuance of a permanent protective order. A hearing was held before Commissioner
Gamer wherein both parties were swom and testimony was elicited. At the conclusion of
the hearing, the Commissioner prepared and signed a Protective Order. Pages, 29-35. The
Protective Order was then signed, immediately thereafter, by Judge John R. Morris. Id.
The Appellant was served with a copy of the Appellee's Protective Order and signed an
Acceptance that same day.
The Appellant filed a Motion and Memorandum to Declare as Unconstitutional the
Practice of Allowing Court Commissioners to Conduct Evidentiary Hearings in Contested
Protective Order Matters and a Facial Challenge to the Cohabitant Abuse Act. Pages, 3746. Contained within the Motion, was a request for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §30-6-4.3. Id. The foregoing Motion was filed within ten days of entry of the
Protective Order and was timely request for evidentiary hearing pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§30-6-4.3.
The Appellee's trial counsel filed a Memorandum in Opposition on the 29th day of
March, 2006. Pages, 49-54. A Notice to Submit for Decision was filed on the 24th day of
May, 2006. Pages, 55-56. A Ruling and Order to Show Cause was filed and issued on the
5th day of July, 2006. Pages, 57-60. Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on the 25th day
Page 5 of 23

of July, 2006. Pages, 64-65. A hearing on the trial court's Order to Show Cause was held
on the 9th day of August, 2006, and the trial court imposed sanctions against Appellant's
counsel in the amount of $100.00.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
It has been the practice in the Second District Court, Ogden Department, to allow
court commissioners to conduct evidentiary hearings on contested applications for a
protective order. The commissioners hear the evidence, make rulings on admissibility, and
determine credibility of the witnesses. The commissioners decided whether a protective
order should be granted. If a protective order is granted, the commissioner fills out the
protective order form and signs the document in open court. The protective order is then
taken to a judge who then signs the protective order. No findings of fact are prepared by
the commissioners to be submitted along with the protective order when it is presented to
the signing judge. This practice of allowing court commissioners to conduct full evidentiary
hearings, rule on admissibility of evidence, determine credibility and "recommend" the
issuance of a protective order is an improper delegation of a core judicial function which
is reserved to the district court judges. The mere fact that the document is then signed by
a judge, and in this case, not the assigned judge, does not save this unconstitutional process.
The procedure of allowing court commissioners to hear and determine contested matters is
violative of Rule 6-401(2)(J) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
The district court should have granted an evidentiary hearing on a timely request as
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provided by statute. The district court should have to hold a de novo jury trial on the legal
claims brought by the Appellant with the court deciding the equitable remedy upon facts
found by a jury, which are common to both. The Cohabitant Abuse Act is unconstitutional
on its face because it provides that only the "court" can preside over a "hearing". The trial
court erred in its ruling that a facial challenge was violative of Rule 11. The trial court
erred in awarding sanctions for the Rule 11 violation.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE PRACTICE OF
ALLOWING COURT COMMISSIONERS TO HOLD EVIDENTIARY
HEARINGS, MAKE RULINGS AND DETERMINE THE OUTCOME
OF A PETITION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER IN CONTESTED
DOMESTIC MATTERS WHEN SUCH PRACTICE IS AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION OF A CORE JUDICIAL
FUNCTION.
The Appellant contends that the procedure as adopted by the trial court and utilized
in his case was unconstitutional The evidentiary hearing held by Commissioner Garner
on the 27th day of February, 2006, was in all aspects a trial of the controversy between the
parties.

Delegating the fact finding and determination of credibility, admissibility of

evidence and relevance to a court commissioner is an unconstitutional delegation of a core
judicial function. Ultimately it is a Article VIII judge who signs the protective order but
in doing so, it is done without reviewing the parties testimony, or any evidence presented
at the hearing. Unlike the federal magistrates, who after conducting evidentiary hearings
make specific findings of fact and written recommendations, the court commissioners
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simply fill out the Protective order form, make the necessary changes or modifications of
the enumerated paragraphs, and present it to the district court for a judge's signature. There
does not appear to be any verbal communications between the signing judge and the
commissioner before the judge affixes his signature to the protective order nor are there any
written findings made as to the issues presented, the rulings on admissibility, determinations
of credibility or what particular facts justify the issuance of a protective order. Without any
meaningful review of the evidence and testimony, the judge signing a protective order is at
best a rubber stamp of the conclusions of the commissioner.
The procedure outlined above and the facts of this case are similar to those in Holm
v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). In Holm, Margaret Holm had custody
of her daughter pursuant to an Ohio Decree of Divorce. Ms. Holm filed the Ohio divorce
decree in Utah, pursuant to the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, along with a motion for Utah
to assume jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and a
petition to modify the divorce decree as to visitation.
Prior to a decision on the issue of the state of Utah as being the child's home state,
Mr. Smilowitz was able to secure a temporary custody order granting him custody of the
parties' minor childfromthe court in Ohio. Mr. Smilowitz traveled to Utah armed with the
custody order. While Mr. Smilowitz was in Utah, Commissioner Lema issued her decision
denying Ms. Holm's Motion to have the Ohio Decree domesticated and enforced in the Utah
courts. Commissioner Lema in a truly bizarre act contacted the "police, and without ever
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having seen the Ohio order, or the order ever having been filed in Utah, told them to enforce
it At 11:40 p.m., the police physically removed the child, screaming and vomiting, from
her mother, and Smilowitz left the state with the child, now three and a half years old." Id.
at 159.
Holm then filed a motion for relief and was eventually granted a hearing before Judge
Eves about a month later. Judge Eves four days later issued a written order denying
"Holm's motion for relief, holding that: (1) Ohio had original and continuing jurisdiction;
(2) Utah declined jurisdiction after consultation with the Ohio court; (3) since the Ohio
order was never filed in Utah, there was no order from which Holm was entitled to relief;
and (4) Utah had no jurisdiction to enforce or prevent enforcement of the Ohio order." Id.
Holm's appealed Judge Eves' order. Holm argued that Commissioner Lema and
Judge Eves committed reversible error in "...refusing Holm a hearing before enforcing the
Ohio change of custody order; and (4) permitting Commissioner Lema to perform
non-delegable judicial acts. " Id. at 160.
In addressing the core argument that "the district court erred by permitting
Commissioner Lema to perform non-delegable judicial acts..." id. at 165, the Court of
Appeals agreed. The Holm Court first determined that the denial of a motion which was
a final appealable order was a "core judicial function" and thus non-delegable.
Commissioner Lema exceeded her authority by attempting to exercise
ultimate judicial power in: (1) deciding Holm's motion for Utah to assume
jurisdiction; (2) informing Holm's attorney that it was her order that the Ohio
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change of custody order be enforced that night; (3) ordering the police to
enforce the undomesticated Ohio order; and (4) denying Holm's attorney's
request for a hearing before the court with regard to the undomesticated Ohio
order. Such was done without authority, and in violation of constitutional
principles, and thus, constituted an unconstitutional exercise of judicial
power.
In performing the acts enumerated above, Commissioner Lema not only
exceeded the bounds of her authority as provided by the Judicial Council
Rules of Judicial Administration, see Rule 6-401(6)(A), but she also assumed
judicial power in violation of Article VIII, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution.
Denying a motion for Utah to assume jurisdiction involves a final
determination of a cause of action and is therefore clearly a judicial function.
See, e.g., McMillen, 460 F.2d at 359; Breaziel, 568 N.E.2d at 1073. Such
power must be exercised solely by a judge, not a commissioner.
And such error could not be cured by ratification by Judge Eves. Judge
Eves did not have the authority to delegate away his judicial power to an
employee in the first place. K.C. v. State, 111 P.2d at 778; accord Mount,
228 So.2d at 858; In re Santa Cruz, 446 P.2d at 255; C.C.C. v. District
Court for the Fourth Judicial Dist, 535 P.2d at 1119; Erves, 249 N.W.2d
at 49; Lewis, 407S.W.2dat856; see generally McMillen, 460 F.2d at 359;
Reed, 459 F.2d at 121. Consequently, he could not subsequently ratify that
employee's illegal judicial acts as his own.
Id. at 168.

The facts of this case are directly on point. Commissioner Garner presided

over the controversy between the parties, as did Commissioner Lema. Commissioner
Garner heard testimony, determined weight and credibility and concluded that a protective
order should be granted. Commissioner Lema acted in a similar capacity and with apparent
authority. Judge Morris by affixing his signature "ratified" Commissioner Garner's
decision. Judge Eves, after a hearing, was guilty of similar conduct. This Court should
conclude that allowing court commissioners to conduct full evidentiary hearings is an
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unconstitutional delegation of a core judicial function.
ARGUMENT
THE PRACTICE OF COURT COMMISSIONERS PRESIDING OVER
A CONTESTED HEARING IS IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF RULE 6401.
Rule 6-401(2)(J) requires domestic relations commissioners to "[c]onduct settlement
conferences with the parties and their counsel in a domestic relations case. Issues that
cannot be settled shall be certified to the district court for trial.95 Rule 6-401(1) defines
"domestic relations" cases as including spouse abuse matters. As outlined above, once
the Appellant and Appellee could not settle as to the Appellee's application for a protective
order, Commissioner Garner was mandated by Rule 6-401(2)(J) to certify "to the district
court for trial" the Appellee's protective order application.
The rule authority granting a court commissioner the power to conduct an evidentiary
hearing is promulgated in Rule 6-401(2)(F) which provides that "[a]t the commissioner's
discretion, and after notice to all parties or their counsel, conduct evidentiary hearings
consistent with paragraph (3)(C) below..." Rule 6-401(3)(C) provides that "[e]xcept in
cases previously certified to the district court, conduct hearings with parties and their
counsel for the purpose of submitting recommendations to the parties and the court.."
It is clearly within the authority for Commissioner Garner to conduct evidentiary
hearings. Rule 6-401(2)(F). Before that can happen, the Commissioner must give "notice
to all parties or their counsel...", which arguably did occur, and conduct those hearings
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consistent with paragraph (3)(C). However, Rule 6-401(3)(C) prohibits a commissioner
from conducting an evidentiary hearing in "cases previously certified to the district court."
Since the Appellee and Appellant were unable to resolve the controversy between them,
those issues which could not be settled; must be certified to the district court for trial
pursuant to Rule 6-401(2)(J). Once the matter is certified to the district court, Rule 6401(3)(C) prohibits a commissioner from conducting an evidentiary hearing.
It is conceded that within the language contained in the Cohabitant Abuse Act,
specifically, Utah Code Ann. §30-6-4.3(l)(e), which provides for or suggests that court
commissioners will be involved in the initial hearing process, would seem to directly or
potentially conflict with Rule 6-401(2)(J). Utah Code Ann. §30-6-4.3(l)(e) provides that
"If the hearing on the petition is heard by a commissioner, either the petitioner or respondent
may file an objection within ten days of the entry of the recommended order and the
assigned judge shall hold a hearing within 20 days of the filing of the objection."
Comparing the statutory provision to the rule, particularly in the likely context of a
contested matter, appears to be a direct conflict.

Clearly, the rule and the statute can be

read harmoniously, only if this Court limits the involvement of the court commissioners to
those protective order applications which are uncontested.
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ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING A REQUEST FOR AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING PURSUANT UTAH CODE ANN. §30-64.3(l)(e) (2006).
Contained with the Motion and Memorandumfiledwith the trial court was a request
for a hearing. Pages 37-46. The Appellant specifically requested a de novo evidentiary
hearing before Judge Jones to the cure the defects of allowing court commissioners to hear
evidentiary hearings in contested protective order cases. Utah Code Ann. §30-6-4.3(l)(e)
provides that if "the hearing on the petition is heard by a commissioner, either the petitioner
or respondent may file an objection within ten days of the entry of the recommended order
and the assigned judge shall hold a hearing within 20 days of the filing of the objection."
Appellant requested under the "Remedy" section that the "only possible remedy for an
unconstitutional delegation of a core judicial function and a violation of Rule 6-401 is a de
novo evidentiary hearing/trial before this Court." Furthermore, the challenge to the
authority of court commissioners to hearing contested protective order matters was the
Appellant's objection pursuant to the statute.
The trial court in its Ruling should have realized that if the protective order is heard
before a commissioner and a timely objection and a request for a hearing is made the trial
court shall grant the movant a hearing before the district court judge. The trial court in
denying the motion did not provide for a hearing as is required by Utah Code Ann. §30-64.3(l)(e).

The trial court's failure to give the Appellant a hearing on a timely filed
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objection was clear error. On remand, this Court should require that the trial court hear the
matter de novo and if this Court agrees with the arguments below, the Appellant should be
entitled to a jury trial on the legal issues and facts common to both the legal and equitable
relief sought by the Appellee.
ARGUMENT
UTAH CODE ANN. §30-6-4.3 LIMITS ANY HEARING NOT IN
FRONT OF A COURT COMMISSIONER TO BE HELD BEFORE
"THE COURT" AND DOES NOT PRESERVE THE RIGHT TO A
JURY TRIAL.
Utah Code Ann. §30-6-4.2(l)(b) and (3) first identify that the Petitioner and
Respondent are entitled to a "hearing". Utah Code Ann. §30-6-4.3(1) again discusses the
need for a "hearing". As identified above, Utah Code Ann. §30-6-4.5(l)(b) requires in
mutual protective orders being requested that there be a "due process hearing". The
legislature's use of the phrase "the court" in relation to the right to a hearing found in §30-64.3(1) has been interpreted by this Court in other statutes to mean a bench trial. In State
in the Interest o/T.B., 933 P.2d 397 (Utah App. 1997), this Court addressed whether a
parent is entitled to a trial by jury in a termination hearing. After determining that a
termination proceeding did not exist at the time the constitution was adopted, this Court
concluded that a parent does not have a constitutional right to a jury. This Court then
looked to the language of the statute to see whether a right to jury trial was embodied within
the provisions regarding termination. The Court held that all references within the statute
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were to "the court". This Court held that the "Act's repeated references to 'the court5 as
fact-finder supports the conclusion that the legislature intended to exclude the use ofjuries
in termination proceedings. See In re Weinstein, 68 111. App. 3d 883,25 IU.Dec. 322, 324,
386 N.E.2d 593, 595 (1979) ("The use of 'the court5 by the legislature suggests that the
court is to be the trier of fact in [termination] proceedings.55).55 Id. at 399. Pursuant to T.B.
the Cohabitant Abuse Act does not provide for a jury.
a.

The Cohabitant Abuse Act was enacted after the constitution but the relief
providedfor, both equitable and legal, did exist at the time the constitution was
enacted
There are two avenues of constitutional protection for a civil litigant in this state, the

first is the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 10 of the
Utah Constitution. The Seventh Amendment preserves the right to jury trial for "suits at
common law,55 where the value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars.
This entitlement extends to all suits where legal rights are involved. Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193, 94 S. Ct 1005, 1007, 39 L.Ed.2d 260 (1974). However, the
Seventh Amendment does not apply to actions which involve only equitable rights or which
traditionally arose in equity. Granflnanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 41, 109 S.Ct.
2782,2790,106 L.Ed.2d 26 (1989). Although "the thrust ofthe Amendment was to preserve
the right to jury trial as it existed in 1791,55 the Seventh Amendment also applies to actions
brought to enforce statutory rights that are analogous to common-law causes of action
ordinarily decided in English law courts in the late 18th century, as opposed to those
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customarily heard by courts of equity or admiralty. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189,193
(1974).
The United States Supreme Court has utilized the following analysis in determing
whether a civil action is entitled to be tried by jury. The Court wrote, "[fjirst, we compare
the statutory action to 18th century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the
merger of the courts of law and equity. Second, we examine the remedy sought and
determine whether it is legal or equitable in nature." lull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412,
417-418 (1987) (citations omitted). The second stage of this analysis is more important than
the first Id at 421." Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 41, 42 (1989).
An applicant for a protective order is entitled to following relief prior to a hearing
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §30-6-4.2(2):
A court may grant the following relief without notice in an order for
protection or a modification issued ex parte:
(a) enjoin the respondent from threatening to commit or committing domestic
violence or abuse against the petitioner and any designated family or
household member;
(b) prohibit the respondent from harassing, telephoning, contacting, or
otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly;
(c) order that the respondent is excluded from the petitioner's residence and
its premises, and order the respondent to stay away from the residence,
school, or place of employment of the petitioner, and the premises of any of
these, or any specified placefrequentedby the petitioner and any designated
family or household member;
(d) upon finding that the respondent's use or possession of a weapon may
pose a serious threat of harm to the petitioner, prohibit the respondent from
purchasing, using, or possessing a firearm or other weapon specified by the
court;
(e) order possession and use of an automobile and other essential personal
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effects, and direct the appropriate law enforcement officer to accompany the
petitioner to the residence of the parties to ensure that the petitioner is safely
restored to possession of the residence, automobile, and other essential
personal effects, or to supervise the petitioner's or respondent's removal of
personal belongings;
(f) grant to the petitioner temporary custody of any minor children of the
parties;
(g) order any further relief that the court considers necessary to provide for
the safety and welfare of the petitioner and any designated family or
household member; and
(h) if the petition requests child support or spousal support, at the hearing on
the petition order both parties to provide verification of current income,
including year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements of year-to-date or
other period of earnings, as specified by the court, and complete copies of tax
returns from at least the most recent year.
Subparts (a) through (c) are consistent with injunctive relief which is an equitable
remedy that existed at the time the federal and state constitutions were enacted. Subpart
(d) could be considered a forfeiture action which clearly predates both consitutions but
could be both equitable and legal depending on the remedy, be it property or money.
Subpart (e) again constitutes in rem and/or replevin both of which existed prior to the
adoption of the federal and this state constitutions. Subpart (f) is also equitable and existed
before the constitutions were enacted. Subpart (g) which provides that the court can "order
any further relief that the court considers necessary to provide for the safety and welfare
of the petitioner and any designated family or household member..." appears to constitute
a legal remedy, a monetary award, such as for spousal support, child support, payment of
joint debts, or a division ofjoint financial assests. Subpart (h) is more a directive as to how
the court would calculate child support and/or spousal support at the hearing as provided
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by Utah Code Ann. 30-6-4.2(3). At the hearing, the court can award all of the foregoing
relief and determine whether parent-time should be allowed.
It is clear from the analysis above, that at the hearing the court will be ordering both
equitable and legal relief. Since the hearing will decide issues involving legal remedies the
parties should be entitled to a trial by jury on the facts common to those issues. As to the
equitable issues the court would make its conclusions based upon jury determined facts and
order the appropriate relief. The Tenth Circuit Court in addressing the procedure when
confronted by both equitable and legal claims found that "when a plaintiff brings both legal
and equitable claims in the same action, the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial on the
legal claims must be preserved by trying those claims first (or at least simultaneously with
the equitable claims), and the jury's findings on any common questions of fact must be
applied when the court decides the equitable claims. See Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc.,
494 U.S. 545, 556 n. 4,110 S.Ct. 1331, 108 L.Ed.2d 504 (1990)." Colorado Visionary
Academy v. Medtronic, Inc., 397 F.3d 867, 875 (10th Cir. 2005).
As to those claims for monetary awards, the Cohabitant Abuse Act violates the
Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. Without repeating the foregoing
analysis provision by provision, the Cohabitant Abuse Act is also violative of Article I,
Section 10 of the Utah Constitution.

Further supportive of the right to trial by jury in

Cohabitant Abuse hearings, is Utah Code Ann. §78-21-1 which provides that "in actions for
the recovery of specific real or personal property, with or without damages, or for money
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claimed as due upon contract or as damages for breach of contract, or for injuries, an issue
of fact may be tried by a jury, unless a juiy trial is waived or a reference is ordered."
It is conceded that the provisions for relief of §30-6-4.2(2)(a), (b), and (c) would
constitute traditional equitable relief which would not be entitled to a trial by jury. Those
provisions in Utah Code Ann. §30-6-4.2(d) and (e) that discuss right to possess a firearm
and the awarding of personal and real property although not entitled to be tried to jury under
the United States and Utah constitution, §78-21-1 would appear to provide that right. The
remaining provision of (f), and (g) are entitled to trial by jury under the federal and state
constitutions and by statute. It is clear that an petition for a protective order encompasses
more than just injunctive relief. The money and property awards authorized by §30-6-4.3
entitled the Appellant a right to trial by jury. This Court should remand this case with
instructions that the Appellant is entitled to a jury trial on the Appellee's application for a
protective order when it is heard before the trial court.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO UTAH CODE ANN. §30-6-1
VIOLATED RULE 11 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.
The challenge made by Appellant before the trial court that the procedure of allowing
court commissioners to decide contested matters violated both the Utah constitution as an
unlawful delegation of a core judicial proceeding and Rule 6-401 of the Code of Judicial
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Administration was well grounded in the law. However, the trial court found that the facial
challenge to Utah Code Ann. §30-6-1 was without a basis in law or fact or for a reasoned
extension of the law.
Rule 11 provides that
an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under
the circumstances, (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the
cost of litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein
are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; (3)
the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and (4) the
denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically
so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.
In his Order to Show Cause Why Sanctions Should Not be Imposed, Pages, 61-63,
Judge Jones contends that since the Motion and Memorandum had previously been argued
infrontof Judge Baldwin, in another case, and denied, that to submit the same argument in
the present case was "not warranted or supported by a nonfrivolous argument." Judge
Jones concluded that since the argument failed before Judge Baldwin, in that Judge Baldwin
ruled that because protective orders are analogous to injunctions which were equitable
claims they were not entitled to be tried before the jury, raising it in this case was without
merit.
As argued above, the Appellant does not disagree with Judge Jones' conclusion
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regarding the injunctive portions of the protective order, it is however the Appellant's
position that both Judge Baldwin and Judge Jones were wrong and that other claims for
relief contained within the protective order are entitled to a jury trial under both the United
States Constitution, Article I, Section 10 of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Ann. §7821-1. Further, as elucidated in Colorado Visionary Academy, supra, the facts common to
both the legal claims and equitable claims would be decided by jury; the jury would
determine the legal relief to be awarded; and trial court would determine any equitable
remedy.
This Court will review the issue of Rule 11 violations and sanctions under a three
part approach: (1) findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard; (2)
legal conclusions are reviewed under the correction of error standard; and (3) the type and
amount of sanction to be imposed is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard."
Morse v. Packer, 15 P.3d 1021,1025 (Utah 2000). This Court should find that Judge Jones
erroneously found that a protective order is purely injunctive. Further that his erroneous
findings led him to the improper conclusion that the Appellant was not entitled to a jury trial
on the legal claims brought by the Appellee. Finally, because Judge Jones' erred in his
factual conclusions and legal ruling any sanction imposed was an abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF REQUESTED
The trial court erred in concluding that the procedure of allowing court
commissioners to hold evidentiary hearings in contested domestic cases was not an
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unconstitutional delegation of a core judicial function.

The trial court erred in not

concluding that the foregoing procedure was also violative of Rule 6-401. The trial court
should have granted the Appellant a evidentiary hearing on a timely request. The trial court
erred in not concluding that Utah Code Ann. 30-6-4 fails to provide for the right to a jury
trial on the legal claims made by the Appellee. The trial court erred in finding the
constitutional challenge a violate of Rule 11. This Court should reverse the trial court's
ruling and remand for a jury trial on the Appellee's legal claims and with instructions to that
order to vacate the order of contempt and return the monies paid by the Appellant's trial
counsel.
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
Oral argument is requested to assist this Court in defining the issues and
understanding the determinative law.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of November, 2 0 0 6 ^ ^

MICHAEL J. BOYLE
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant's
Brief, this 29th day of November, 2006, to Jennifer Spangenberg, Esq., 893 - 24* Street,
Suite 300, Ogden, Utah 84401.
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